Whale entanglements in fishing gear threaten whale populations, seafood production and long-term sustainability of commercial fisheries. While multiple mitigation strategies to reduce entanglements exist, there has been minimal consideration of the economic impact of these strategies. Here, we estimated retrospective losses to ex-vessel revenues for one of California’s most lucrative fisheries. Overall, we found fishery closures decreased ex-vessel revenue, with results showing some uncertainty due to large model prediction error. Regional differences in losses revealed interesting trends in the capacity for the fishery to recoup costs. For example, in the NMA, relatively small losses at the fishery level were predicted ($0.3 million in total) for the 2019 season despite an early closure to the season due to whale entanglement risk.
NMA fishers collectively were able to meet predicted revenue for the season despite a shortening of the fishing 2019 season. In the 2020 season however, the NMA did not experience disturbances due to whale entanglements but larger ex-vessel losses (of $3.9 million) were predicted. This suggests that other disturbances such as a delay to the season due to crab meat quality, lost fishing opportunity related to the COVID-19 pandemic, or other unknown factors, had an influence on ex-vessel revenue during the 2020 season. While most of the 2020 season landings in the NMA occurred before COVID-19 arrived in the US, there is evidence that prices in latter part of the season may have been depressed due to loss of export markets for live crab47.
In the CMA however, despite landing the majority of crab available during the 2019 season (see Fig. 2c), losses of $9.4 million were experienced across the fishery. While total fishery catch was not greatly reduced, closure to the fishery in the spring may be responsible for revenue losses through other mechanisms (e.g. price). In the 2020 season, whale entanglement risk substantially shortened the fishing season in the CMA, through a delay at the beginning of the season and an early closure in the spring. Estimated losses were largest ($14.4 million) during this season. It is likely that the COVID-19 pandemic was also responsible for some of this estimated loss in the CMA in the 2020 season47. Our model did not control for impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. However, price trends suggest that that price of Dungeness Crab in California was not affected until mid-March 2020, at which point the fishery had caught 92% of the seasons catch (see Supplementary File S2). Prices then returned to normal levels in mid-May. If we apply extrapolated prices between mid-March and mid-May by replacing observed prices with linearly increasing prices by week, revenues would have been $753,754 higher in total across the fishery. This rough estimate suggests we can attribute 4.1% of overall estimated revenue losses during the 2020 season to COVID-19 impacts, with the caveat that we do not know what prices would have been in the absence of the pandemic. A counterfactual approach has been used to disentangle multiple stressors to infer causal impacts of management interventions elsewhere48, however as these closures, and the COVID pandemic, potentially impacted all fishers in the California Dungeness crab fishery, there are no control groups available for comparison and therefore this approach would not be appropriate.
Closures and other disturbances appear to have been less impactful in the NMA and high price for Dungeness crab may have contributed to the ability of vessels operating in the NMA to withstand disturbances (Supplementary Fig. S2). Prices were particularly high during the summer portion of the season in 2020 during which time the CMA was closed to Dungeness crab fishing (Supplementary Fig. S2). The NMA did not experience closures due to whale entanglement during 2020 and was predicted to have lower than average pre-season abundance (lower catch potential) during 2020 (see Fig. 2.b), while the CMA was predicted to have high catch potential for 2020 (Fig. 2.c), therefore differences in management measures implemented, and seasons’ catch potential, also contributed to differences in losses estimated.
The CMA also experienced high prices, including decadal high prices for crab during the November–December of the 2019 fishing season (Supplementary Fig. S2). However, losses observed overall across the two seasons suggest the fishery, unlike the NMA, did not get much overall benefit from the high price in 2019 or the high pre-season abundance of crab (i.e. catch potential) estimated for the 2020 season in the CMA. A number of factors may have contributed to a poor season in the CMA including catchability or biology of Dungeness crab as well as external factors such as the COVID-19 pandemic behavioral choice factors, for example deciding not to fish45. Temporally shifting or reducing the opportunity for participation through closed periods due to whale entanglement risk may have exacerbated other impacts on revenues in the CMA which were not as impactful on revenues in the NMA.
The high variability in estimated economic impacts per vessel reported here demonstrates that closures did not affect all vessels equally, similarly to impacts observed following a climate related harmful algal bloom in the 2016 season which were variable by vessel size and between communities45. The estimated losses we present at the fishery level in the NMA and CMA may therefore be underestimated, or overestimated, for particular groups of vessels within those management areas. This reflects the diverse nature of the Dungeness Crab fishery in behaviour and fishing strategy and highlights the importance of capturing impacts at finer scales than the fishery level alone.
Limitations to the estimation of closure impacts
A limitation of the hurdle model is that there are other latent factors influencing fishery participation and revenues that our model does not incorporate, particularly those determining fisher behavior such as fuel price, shipyard backlogs and market demand. A behavioral choice model, for example one that incorporates location or fishing alternative choice given a closure50,51,52 would be a potential method to better understand how spatial management strategies affect fisher behavior and is recommended as a future analysis to assess trade-offs involving socio-economic risk. Our results, reporting losses from Dungeness crab fishing revenue only, also do not account for the ability of some fishers to mitigate revenue losses by participating in other fisheries. Dungeness crab fishing is highly connected within west coast fishery participation networks44,45. Thus, it is important to note that our results for the 2019 and 2020 seasons present only losses from Dungeness crab fishing and may overestimate total annual revenue losses by some vessels that are able to mitigate impacts with participation in other fisheries.
The model, predicting out-of-sample, over-estimated revenues in recent years suggesting that our predictions of revenues may also be over-predicted. An improved estimation at the vessel level, given some over-estimation of vessels that did not fish, could be investigated through a selection model approach rather than a two-part model approach54. However, two-part models are most appropriate for estimation of conditional (actual) outcomes as was intended here rather than unconditional (potential) outcomes and they do not require separate drivers for the selection and estimation model, which we did not have available54. When the impacts of policy interventions are difficult to disentangle from other impacts, approaches such as a counterfactual synthetic control48 approach could be used to separate the impacts of the policy alone. In this context, however, it is useful to report the cumulative impact of disturbances given that these disturbances (e.g., delays due to crab quality, harmful algal blooms) happen frequently and therefore the closures will rarely happen in isolation.
Whilst there are limitations to our approach, revenue predictions presented here offer more insight compared to predicting revenues based only on a 5-year average of total fishery revenues (Supplementary Table S3) as is commonly conducted to calculate disaster assistance requirement, as our analysis includes an estimation of crab abundance as well as historical vessel level data in its estimation. Accounting for the influence of crab abundance is critical in this fishery given abundance is highly variable and the majority of fishable biomass is taken each year. Estimation of revenue at the individual vessel level allows for consideration of fishery heterogeneity (e.g., by vessel size). Revenues calculated on a 5-year average would suggest total California Commercial Dungeness crab fishery revenues would have been $10.62 million higher than observed in 2019 and $12.73 million higher than observed in 2020 (Supplementary Table S3). Thus, revenues estimated on the 5-year average suggest that losses would have been $0.97 million higher than our model prediction across the fishery for 2019 and $5.56 million lower than our model prediction for 2020. Our predictions suggest that delays and closures due to whale entanglement mitigation and other disturbances in to the 2019 and 2020 seasons were similar to the impact of closures due to the HAB in the 2016 season, which were estimated at $13.6 million in losses from Dungeness Crab revenues across the fishery38.
Economic cost of mitigation
Many strategies that prevent fishery interactions with marine mammals exist, including gear reductions or modifications, depth limitations and dynamic or seasonal time-area closures13,14,22,23,24,25,26,55. Whilst the fishery does implement pro-active gear modification measures set out in the best practices guide34, only two management intervention options were enacted in the 2019 and 2020 seasons to mitigate against entanglements of marine life with Dungeness crab gear; delays to the start of the crab season in the winter and early closures in spring due to overlap with whale distribution in fishing grounds. These delays and closures can have differential impacts on the fishery as the fishing season is not heterogeneously prosperous. An example is that closures during the holiday season (Nov–Dec) when Dungeness crab is traditionally consumed can cause substantial lost revenue opportunity for fishers at a time when price and demand are highest35,49. The fishery operates as a derby in which the majority of revenues are made in the first month of the fishery being open. The strong seasonal dynamics of the Dungeness crab fishery, largely driven by rapid depletion of legal sized crab, mean that the timing of management actions can have important impacts on fishing revenues. Across the fishery, based on observed vessel level revenues during the 2011–2018 baseline period, vessels earned an average of 62.33% (SD 24.04) of annual ex-vessel revenue during the first month of the season (15th Nov–15th Dec for the CMA/1st Dec–31st Dec for the NMA). After April 1st, vessels on average earn 10.54% (SD 18.98) of annual ex-vessel revenue. This average, based only on vessels that historically have actively participate past April 1st, (283 vessels in the NMA, 346 vessels in the CMA) rises to 20.36% (SD 13.37) of ex-vessel revenue. Thus, while the majority of the overall fisheries revenue is taken at the start of the season, an April 1st closure could still have a substantial impact on the revenues of active fishing vessels in the spring. Determination of economic risk for the fishery, at a minimum, should consider timing of closures in addition to total revenue losses, in order to quantify losses that will be felt at the individual vessel level. We suggest further research to investigate how closures affect different groups of fishers through stakeholder participation.
Socio-economic impacts from whale mitigation measures could permeate into communities further than our analysis (based on ex-vessel revenue only) conveys35,36,37,49, and further investigation into these community level impacts is necessary to understand and sustain an equitable fishery supply chain even where there is no absolute revenue loss. Some of the communities influenced by whale entanglement mitigation in California rely heavily on ocean resources for employment, through fishing occupations but also through hospitality and tourism. Managing this issue in a way that minimizes the burden on resource dependent communities is strongly in line with the objectives set out in the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDG’s), especially SDG 14 (life below water) but also related goals such as human well-being, reducing inequality and reducing the impacts of climate change56.
Management Implications
Balancing socio-economic impacts against whale entanglement risk is challenging given the legally protected status of whale populations. However, potential economic losses reported here should motivate the development of mitigation measures (through cooperative innovation between industry, researchers and managers) that allow fishery production to be optimized whilst ensuring successful whale protection. At present, entire management areas, which constitute large regions of the coast, are closed in response to whale entanglement risk in California. Investigating how to minimize the spatiotemporal footprint of closures, such as by defining high risk zones dynamically based on fine-scale information of whale density and fishing effort, could provide an alternative mitigation structure. This could better consider the economic and conservation trade-offs while still being sensitive to changing environmental conditions. The introduction of dynamic zone closures, often broadly referred to as dynamic ocean management, has been demonstrated to reduce risk whilst minimizing lost fishing opportunities12,26,57,58, especially when environmental variability is high or species have a dynamic distribution59. Moreover, analysis of policy instruments to reduce whale entanglements with the American lobster fishery on the US Northeast coast found that economic costs of risk reduction could be 20% lower when mitigation decisions considered fishing opportunity costs alongside non-monetary benefits (biological risk), compared to non-monetary benefits alone12. This is promising for the implementation of such strategies in the California Current System.
The caveat of this strategy is that dynamic zone closures require spatially and temporally explicit information on whale density and fishing effort which can be costly to attain. The use of ropeless gear has also been suggested as an alternative whale entanglement mitigation measure that requires further research and development before being initiated as an alternative regulatory tool60. The costs of monitoring or technical advancements however may outweigh the financial and societal cost of fishery closures. Revenue losses for Dungeness crab estimated here for the 2019 and 2020 seasons are on par with losses experienced during the HAB period. During the delays to the 2016 fishing season an estimated $26.1 million was lost from ex-vessel revenues from all species that crab fishers target, including $13.6 million from Dungeness crab alone38, requiring $25 million in government aid. Whale mitigation under the RAMP regulation will potentially delay or close the fishery year after year with uncertain economic impact that cannot be sustainably resolved with government aid. Development of tools to mitigate against economic loss while achieving whale protection will be necessary to come to a sustainable solution. This can only be achieved by first including economic loss in risk assessments. Doing so may also provide balance to partnerships between fishery managers and fishers.
Regulators are obligated to protect Humpback whales, blue whales and Leatherback turtles using the best available science33. In this fishery, current triggers to open and close are based on a range of factors, but thus ultimately depend on the number of whales present within a management region33. Regulators have a number of alternative regulatory options available to them, which include depth restrictions, gear restrictions or modifications and fleet advisories, if they can offer the same level of whale protection33. Yet, the RAMP process lacks the socio-economic information needed to consider the socio-economic risk of regulatory actions, and that of the alternatives, to the fishing community. Results presented here highlight that the economic effects and that risk to fishing communities should be considered when designing whale entanglement mitigation programs33. Having this economic information will facilitate the ability of managers, as set out in the RAMP regulation (subsection d4)33, to consider the socio-economic impact if deciding between management measures that equivalently reduce entanglement risk.
We have used two fishing seasons as an example of the economic impacts of these new whale entanglement regulations which will be implemented each year going forward. Synthesis of ex-vessel revenues is not a complete picture of the socio-economic impacts of regulations, but it provides a starting point for protecting both whales and fishing communities. While reported whale entanglements remain higher than pre-2014 totals, reported whale entanglements in California have declined markedly in the years following the 2014–2016 large marine heatwave (Fig. 1b). This is a success for this fishery and attributed to increased awareness, development of best practices for fishing gear and the mitigation program to protect whales. We now need to be successful at protecting and mitigating the socio-economic impacts to fishery participants and the fishing communities they support.
Source: Ecology - nature.com
