There is a recent change in the modus operandi of Brazilian Amazon deforestation. The proportion of illegal deforestation in public land increased from ~43–44% (2015–2018) to ~49–52% (2019–2021)10. Land grabbers occupy public lands (deforesting or raising cattle) in a high-risk expectation of receiving title to the land and/or trading the land with significant returns (land speculation)6,7. Therefore, we argue that it is crucial to rapidly assign most of the Amazon’s UPFs to land tenure regimes associated with conservation. Land-tenure security will bring greater governance and protection to these areas. Achieving this goal requires a combination of three measures: (1) careful attention to the choice of land tenure categories for UPFs, (2) technological improvements, and (3) law enforcement.
Choice of land tenure category for UPFs
Public lands in Brazil include several categories, such as conservation areas (with several subcategories under law number 9985/2000), Indigenous lands, and rural settlements, among others. Therefore, the category choice for each undesignated public land area requires studies to determine those lands’ social, environmental, or productive suitability, taking note of their histories of occupation, cultural importance, and potential uses. The unpopulated forest is a myth. Most of the areas in the Amazon have been occupied by human populations—traditional communities, indigenous villages, uncontacted tribes, “riverside” (ribeirinho) peoples, or small farmers—for generations. Ancestral occupation of land without proof or associated studies, however, does not guarantee land rights. Therefore, to avoid unfair competition for land and unilateral political decisions, the best choice of land category for a given UPF to meet social, ecological and economic demands would benefit from active social participation, multidisciplinary scientific studies, in situ observations, and innovative technologies (e.g., remote sensing, data processing capabilities, machine learning, cloud computing) to provide fast, scalable, and quality information.
Final allocation decisions, however, must be preceded by participatory and transparent consultation processes to avoid conflicts and safeguard land rights. The measure of assigning tenure categories to the UPFs has a high level of complexity in itself and may benefit from the support of multi-actors (e.g., governments, academia, civil society, private sector) at multi-levels (e.g., studies, participation processes, decision-making processes) and multi-scales (local, regional and national). Despite the complexity, there are examples in the early 2000s of joint efforts to allocate land (“Terra Legal” Program) and create protected areas on a large scale and in a short period of time in the Brazilian Amazon. We emphasize, however, that the tenure categories selected for the UPFs need to maintain forest cover, remain in the public domain in compliance with national laws, and enhance long-term Amazon conservation, respecting the rights of resident populations.
Technological improvements to control land grabbing in UPF
Lasting conservation of the Amazon rainforest depends on ending land-grabbing and illegal deforestation in public forests (designated or undesignated). However, land grabbers are using a self-declaratory tool to declare illegally invaded public lands as private properties, which demands immediate technological improvements to the system.
The Rural Environmental Registry (CAR is the Portuguese acronym) is a mechanism of environmental oversight of private lands under the Brazilian Forest Code (Law 12,651/2012). CARs are registered on a web-based platform (Rural Environmental Registry System – SICAR). By law, landowners must self-declare their property boundaries and land use types (e.g., residential, agricultural, protection) in SICAR, respecting legally required protection of certain forest areas and watercourses. Then, a state environmental agency must validate the information. Unfortunately, the validation process has been extremely slow (e.g., <1% of 6.6 million properties validated by 2022)11, creating opportunities for fraud.
A priority action for improving the system, thus, is to speed up the CAR validation process, eliminating illegal registrations from the system.
The validation task would be much more simplified if the federal and state governments had an integrated CAR database and system. Brazil has unique and comprehensive data on land tenure (e.g.,12), land use changes13, and public forests (Brazilian Forest Service), among many others. The challenge lies in integrating these data, which would allow quick consultation and visualization of the areas, compliance verification, record validation, and facilitation of the decision-making process. The integrated system would provide powerful tools in the fight against illicit activity without penalizing those in compliance with the regulations. This is a straightforward task that can be accomplished quickly if governments, academics, and technical experts collaborate in solving technology and data management challenges associated with systems integration.
Removing the illegal CAR from the SICAR database is crucial. Around 20 million hectares (20%) of UPFs are already illegally declared as private property7. Approximately 3.4 million hectares of UPFs that were illegally deforested by 2020, about 65%, overlapped with illegal CAR7. This scenario represents a time bomb of deforestation, ready to be detonated over the coming years. Land grabbers have also been using false property registration to receive economic advantages, such as bank loans. A Resolution (No. 3545/2008) of the Central Bank of Brazil requires evidence of environmental compliance (such as CAR) from producers to qualify for public loans. These loans, in turn, when granted to land grabbers, may be inadvertently funding new deforestation in public areas.
Law enforcement
Among different ways to prevent and discourage crimes, punishment is a measure usually applied for law violations. Fines, for instance, are commonly used in environmental crimes. Uncollected fines, thus, signal impunity and motivate the perpetuation of environmental crimes14. In Brazil, gaps in regulations15 provide opportunities for noncompliance with fines, which often expire after successive judicial appeals. Therefore, those who invade and deforest public forests have invariably escaped the rigors of the law. In the current judicial system, other sanctions, such as embargoes on illegally deforested rural properties and confiscation of means of production, proved to be more effective14.
Administrative and regulatory reforms, thus, are needed so that offenders can be prosecuted promptly, receive sanctions in proportion to the severity of their violations, and be effectively and quickly punished. These reforms will require experts in law and administrative processes to find the best way to solve gaps, but the measure’s success depends on support from within the regulatory/supervisory agencies and in the legislative bodies favorable to more robust and reliably enforced rules. For instance, a point worth considering is that although cumulative and financially heavier environmental penalties may influence would-be offenders16, the deterrent effect of an increase in enforced penalties (e.g., with a credible collection of fines, embargoes on properties, among others) may prove greater than highly severe, but difficult to enforce, sanctions. While still to be tested in environmental crimes, the assumption is that, pedagogically, some “swift and certain” punishment is preferable to impunity due to ineffective or too harsh legal coercion17.
Source: Ecology - nature.com
